Op Sindoor called Pak nuclear bluff, exposed its military vulnerabilities

The ceasefire between India and Pakistan will be good for both countries—indeed for the wide world. While Pakistan violated it within hours of accepting the truce, it gave a critical strategic window—especially for its embattled military leadership. It is a welcome development in the long-standing tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Brokered by the Donald Trump administration, the ceasefire was a diplomatic milestone aimed at de-escalating the spiraling conflict that had emerged in the wake of the April 22 terrorist outrage in Pahalgam. The brief ceasefire allowed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, a momentary escape from a worsening military and diplomatic position. Facing increasing internal and external pressure, the jihadist general was rapidly losing the narrative. His aggressive posturing had not only failed to intimidate India but had also drawn international criticism and internal dissent. The limited ceasefire, though undermined quickly by Pakistani provocation, gave Munir a way to de-escalate without an outright retreat—a face-saving maneuver for a general whose militaristic rhetoric had only brought grief to his nation. On the other hand, India’s response to the April 22 attack was swift and resolute without being disproportionate and escalatory.

Launched in the early hours of May 7, Operation Sindoor was a calculated and multifaceted military campaign, aimed at identifying and punishing those responsible for the Pahalgam atrocity. The operation marked a turning point in the India-Pakistan standoff, not just in military terms, but in the strategic messaging it conveyed. First and foremost, India effectively called Islamabad’s nuclear bluff. For decades, Pakistan had relied on its nuclear arsenal as a shield behind which it continued to sponsor cross-border terrorism. However, India’s decisive and unapologetic military action under Operation Sindoor sent a clear signal: nuclear deterrence would no longer paralyse India’s strategic autonomy. New Delhi demonstrated its willingness to calibrate a proportionate but firm military response, thereby changing the rules of engagement. Secondly, India weaponised one of the most overlooked but powerful tools at its disposal—water. The Narendra Modi government has done it ingeniously. By keeping the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, India signaled its intent to leverage every instrument of statecraft. The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 with the World Bank’s mediation, has long been seen as a pillar of India-Pakistan cooperation, even during wars. Temporarily suspending this treaty marked a major diplomatic shift, suggesting that provocations would now incur real and sustained costs for Pakistan, beyond conventional military retaliation. Third, Operation Sindoor might have succeeded in weakening General Asim Munir’s standing within Pakistan. His aggressive maneuvers had promised military success and strategic leverage. Instead, they brought military losses, global condemnation, and economic instability. The brief ceasefire revealed cracks in his command structure and possibly opened the door to internal critiques from within the Pakistani establishment. If Munir’s political capital was built on the promise of victory through belligerence, the fallout from Operation Sindoor may have deeply eroded that foundation. While the ceasefire itself remains tenuous, and was almost immediately violated, its implications are long-term. For India, it provided a platform to showcase its new strategic doctrine—one that combines diplomatic restraint with military resolve and economic leverage. For Pakistan, it exposed the hollow rhetoric of its military elite and highlighted the diminishing returns of using terror as state policy.