Rahman must strive to restore ties with India
The newly sworn-in Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Tarique Rahman, hasn’t said or indicated anything so far that could be construed as anti-India. This is a good sign from Delhi’s perspective in a country where Islamism is rising and anti-India sentiments are intense and rife. Prime Minister Narendra Modi posted a message in Bengali, congratulating the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader on his “decisive victory.”
To be sure, Rahman won an unfair election, as former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s party, the Awami League, was not allowed to contest. Modi has shown magnanimity in warmly greeting Rahman, given the fact that he is the beneficiary of the ouster of Hasina, who maintained good ties with India, to where she fled to after a jihadist uprising in July 2024 removed her a month later.
Modi promised India’s support for a “democratic, progressive and inclusive” neighbour. Islamists in Bangladesh will dislike the last two adjectives. It will also rile them that Rahman has appointed a veteran Hindu BNP politician, Nitai Roy Chowdhury, as Minister. With the Awami League not in the reckoning, the BNP is the most moderate political entity in the country. Its past, however, does not inspire much confidence in Delhi.
In 2001, the BNP joined hands with the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami under Rahman’s mother, Khaleda Zia, and returned to office, resulting in a setback to India-Bangladesh relations. The ties improved later, during Hasina’s 15-year rule. Rahman, therefore, must walk a tightrope, balancing the aspirations of Islamists and pressure from Pakistan with the national interest that lies on economic development and good relations with India. The Islamists expect a rollback of policies they perceive as excessively secular and pro-India.
They may push for greater space in governance, stricter social codes, and a foreign policy tilt that reduces dependence on New Delhi. Simultaneously, elements within Pakistan may view the political transition in Dhaka as an opportunity to rebuild strategic influence lost during the Hasina years. Diplomatic overtures, ideological affinity through Islamist networks, and intelligence linkages could all feature in this recalibration.
Yet Bangladesh’s national interest points in a different direction. The country’s economic progress over the past decade has been built on export-led growth, infrastructure development, and relative internal stability. India is one of its largest trading partners and an essential transit route for regional connectivity. Energy cooperation, including cross-border electricity trade, underpins Bangladesh’s industrial expansion. Moreover, India’s geographic centrality makes estrangement costly. Unlike distant partners, India cannot be bypassed.
Rahman’s challenge, therefore, is to reconcile ideological constituencies with economic realities. A confrontational posture toward India might yield short-term political dividends among hardliners but would risk undermining investor confidence and regional stability. Conversely, overt alignment with New Delhi could provoke backlash from Islamist factions and segments of the electorate primed on nationalist rhetoric. For India, prudence is paramount. Public pressure or overt displays of influence would be counterproductive.
Instead, quiet diplomacy, economic engagement, and respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty should guide policy. By framing cooperation in terms of mutual benefit—trade facilitation, energy security, climate resilience, and connectivity—New Delhi can help Rahman justify constructive ties domestically. Cautious optimism is the term that describes the present situation. Rahman’s silence on anti-India themes and Modi’s gracious outreach creates diplomatic space. Rahman’s actions will determine whether that space expands into a durable partnership or contracts under ideological strain.