A Constitutional Conundrum

In a constitutional democracy, the rule of law is not merely a legal principle—it is the moral compass that ensures no one, including the state’s agents, is above the law. Yet, when judicial interpretations of procedural safeguards—originally intended to protect honest officials—begin to shield grave misconduct, the edifice of public accountability begins to crack. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in G.C. Manjunath & Ors. vs. Seetaram (2025 INSC 439) starkly illustrates this crisis.

The Crux of the Judgment

In this case, the complainant Seetaram accused multiple police officers of shocking misconduct: false criminal cases, custodial torture, stripping, physical assault, and public defamation through manipulated photographs. These actions, according to the complaint, were carried out as retaliation for his prior activism against corruption within the police ranks. Despite these grave allegations, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings—not because the allegations lacked merit—but because the prosecution lacked prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963.

The Court held that the accused officers, although they may have exceeded their authority, had acted under the colour of official duty. Therefore, a valid sanction from the Government was a sine qua non before any court could take cognizance.

What the Lower Courts Had Found

This judgment reversed well-reasoned findings by the Magistrate, the Sessions Court, and the Karnataka High Court. These courts had independently held that the accused police officers’ actions—breaking teeth, stripping, and publishing defamatory content—were so excessive, vengeful, and disconnected from legitimate police work that they could not qualify as acts done in the discharge of official duty. The lower courts relied on key Supreme Court precedents which interpreted Section 197 CrPC narrowly in cases involving egregious abuse.

Contrasting Judicial Precedents: When Sanction is Not Required:

The Supreme Court itself has, in prior judgments, robustly protected victims from procedural shields:

In Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 326, the Supreme Court held that if the public servant acts not in discharge of official duty but for personal vendetta, sanction is not required.

In P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704, the Apex Court clarified that the test is whether the act has a reasonable nexus with official duty; if not, sanction is unnecessary.

Further in Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court reiterated that abuse of public office for personal ends is not protected by Section 197.

Even in State of Maharashtra v. C.H. Gautam, (2000) 6 SCC 773, it emphasised that motive matters—if the act was rooted in malice, official character is irrelevant.

Each of these judgments supports the principle that a public servant must not be allowed to hide behind the veil of officialdom when the act in question betrays the very spirit of lawful authority.

Constitutional Safeguards: The Spirit of Article 14 and 21:

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Manjunath has raised constitutional concerns. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and Article 21 ensures protection of life and personal liberty. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, the Supreme Court held that custodial violence is an affront to human dignity and a direct violation of Article 21.

When courts decline to examine custodial torture claims on procedural grounds, it erodes these fundamental guarantees. The procedural requirement of sanction must not override the constitutional right to seek redress.

What the Framers of the Constitution Intended ?

The Constituent Assembly Debates also offer a compelling lens. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar warned that unchecked executive immunity would be antithetical to republican governance. The debates reveal an explicit preference for limiting the protection of officials to genuine acts of state—not misconduct disguised as duty.

In the debate on Article 311 (which deals with dismissal of public servants), members of the Assembly were insistent that public servants be held accountable when they overstep their bounds. As Prof. K.T. Shah stated, “Power without accountability is tyranny.”

The Danger of Judicial Over-Protection

By placing disproportionate weight on sanction requirements, the Manjunath judgment risks creating a culture of impunity. It sends a message that procedural shields can be used to evade accountability—even when allegations involve violence, humiliation, and malice.

It further discourages victims from coming forward, especially when state authorities habitually delay or deny sanction, as occurred in Seetaram’s case despite repeated representations over years.

The Need for Reform:-

• Legislative Clarification: Parliament must amend Section 197 CrPC to exclude serious crimes such as torture, rape, or custodial death from its ambit.

• Independent Sanctioning Authorities: Instead of relying on police departments or state governments, an independent prosecutorial body should be empowered to decide on sanction requests in cases involving alleged human rights violations.

• Judicial Prudence: Courts must interpret sanction laws in harmony with fundamental rights, ensuring that access to justice is not blocked by bureaucratic silence.

In Peroration, The judgment in G.C. Manjunath & Ors. vs. Seetaram underscores a sobering truth: the line between protecting the state and shielding the powerful is perilously thin. While the judiciary must safeguard honest officials from vendetta-driven prosecutions, it must do so without letting the Constitution become a casualty of procedural formalism. Justice must not only be done—but also seen to be done. And in cases of state excess, it must also be enabled to be done.

References:

• Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 326

• P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704

• Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1

• State of Maharashtra v. C.H. Gautam, (2000) 6 SCC 773

• D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416

• Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, 16 Sept. 1949

(Writer is Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India)

(Writer is Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India)