An insider’s account

Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra was among the second batch of 10 officers who joined the prestigious Indian Foreign Services (IFS) in 1949. Born on September 11, 1924, in a humble Dogra Brahmin family, Rasgotra obtained Masters in English from Punjab University and began his career as a tutor.

The opening chapters of the autobiography give the reader a glimpse of his childhood days, achievements at school and college, eloquence in Hindi poetry and the travails endured during partition. Aside emphatically interpreting crafty high-level diplomatic negotiations, Rasgotra unhesitatingly, narrates the tragedy that stuck their lives when they lost their 10-year-old son. The equanimity and poise exuded by him are worth emulating.

During his long and eventful career, Rasgotra held official positions at mission offices at UN, UNESCO, Nepal, Britain, US, France, Morocco, Tunisia, Netherlands, besides serving as Foreign Secretary during the reign of former Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. He officially retired from service in January of 1985 but continued to work as High Commissioner to the UK till 1990 upon the Prime Minister’s request. Written entirely from his memory, at the age of almost 90, the author eloquently narrates the story of India, the trials and tribulations faced.

Rasgotra begins the story of independent India by pondering on the unique contributions of pioneering leaders in Indian Diplomacy- Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Dr Sarvepalli RadhaKrishna, VK Krishna Menon and KM Panikkar. Days before independence, the majority of the British officers who occupied high positions in External Affairs Department began to return to London or went to Pakistan.

India was tasked with the burden of reorganisation of the two departments— Departments of Common Wealth Relations and External Affairs. Rasgotra pays ode to Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who took the onerous task of the overhaul and reorganisation of the department as the secretary general. Bajpai channelised and instituted the process of recruitment young and talented candidates for foreign services.

The book, unveiled by Yashwant Sinha, caught instant attention of strategic analysts with stunning revelations about Nehru’s refusal to accept President Kennedy’s offer for help in detonating a nuclear bomb in 1961. US intelligence was cognizant of China’s swift progress towards developing a nuke in late 1950’s. Kennedy who was an admirer of India’s democracy wanted India to be the first country to test a nuke and not the Communist China.

Hence Kennedy sent a handwritten letter through US ambassador Galbraith with a technical note from the chairman of US atomic Commission offering assistance to Indian scientists for detonating an American nuke from the top of a tower in Rajasthan Desert. Being aware of Nehru’s commitment against nuclear arms, Kennedy persisted that “Nothing is more important than nuclear security”.

Nehru shared the letter with G Parthasarathy and Dr Homi Bhabha. Dr Bhabha favoured acceptance, but Parthasarathy sought time. After holding talks with Galbraith and BM Mullick, Parthasarathy recommended spurning the offer. (BN Mullick, Director Intelligence Bureau, was indicted by Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, for failing to assess Chinese preparedness along the border in 1960-61 leading to worst ever defeat of India at hands of China during 1962 war).

A diplomatic misjudgement and seeking counsel from incompetent authorities played havoc for India. This disclosure came at a time when India was valiantly lobbying various countries for NSG membership. Fifty years, hence, India is now struggling to get into the nuclear regime. The offer, if accepted then, could have averted the wars of 1962 and 1965 with China and Pakistan respectively.

Similarly, the book sheds light on the Shimla Agreement wherein India was criticised to have conceded to demands of Pakistan. In 1972, India won convincingly over Pakistan. Bangladesh was liberated, 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were captured and India occupied areas of strategic importance to Pakistan (through which Pakistan gained entry into Kashmir Valley in 1965 and 1971).

But according to the Shimla Agreement, India handed over prisoners of war and agreed to vacate the strategic positions as a goodwill gesture. Also, both countries agreed to resolve differences through peaceful bilateral negotiations ruling out third party intervention and that cease-fire line of 17th December 1971 will be converted into Line of Control (LoC). Indeed ZA Bhutto in one-to-one talks with Indira Gandhi agreed to treat LoC as the international border and promised to persuade his people to support the same but later reneged.

The architects of Shimla agreement were Haksar, DP Dhar and PN Dhar. Rasgotra says that he later asked Haksar as why he offered concessions at LoC, he revealed that Bhutto sought a private meeting with him and fell on his feet. Bhutto begged Haksar not to send him back empty-handed as he will be butchered by his enemies back in Pakistan.

Shedding light on factors that messed up the Kashmir issue, Rasgotra indicated that armies of both India and Pakistan during the 1948 war were commanded by British Officers. Officers fighting for both sides were in touch with each other regularly and were controlled by British authorities. The British officers fighting for India ignored Nehru’s command and failed to Pakistan troops packing from the Gilgit-Baltistan region creating a formidable rift between warring neighbours.

Consequently, the strategically important region is now jointly exploited by China and Pakistan. Harbouring grudging animosities against India, Britain always sided with Pakistan and supported its stance on Kashmir at UN. Even as the US gifted a submarine to Pakistan despite repeated pleas, Britain refused to sell one to India. In August 1953 India and Pakistan were close to resolving Kashmir issue through Nehru-Bogra agreement but the US sabotaged the bilateral settlement.

Nehru wanted to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir even it meant losing the valley. Bogra agreed to the appointment of a neutral administrator for a plebiscite in Delhi but after his visit from the US, he backtracked. In all, the book is an amazing read to all foreign policy enthusiasts offering a fantastic overview of India’s diplomacy during the early years of independence and later. For all the rich details and rare insights the book, it qualifies to be a compendium on Indian diplomacy.

By: Ramaharitha Pusarla