State Security Commissions: Bringing little to the table

Undue political interference in policing is pervasive in India. Politically motivated transfers, agendas imposed on policing during communal riots, and orders on whom to investigate and arrest, are well-established problems.

In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered the creation of State Security Commissions to address these problems in its landmark Prakash Singh judgement. The Court envisaged the body as a buffer between the police and the politician. In order to represent a wide constituency, the body is to include the highest political and police leadership, the Leader of the Opposition, a retired judge and independent non-government members. As a police oversight institution, it is to set policing policy and evaluate police performance.

Eight years since Prakash Singh, CHRI has released its second national-level report on the police oversight mechanisms. State Security Commissions: Bringing Little to the Table documents the failure of the Commissions to gain traction in most states, let alone effect a meaningful impact on policing. It examines the flaws in their composition, mandate, powers and functioning, and suggests recommendations that will be essential to revive the failing mechanisms.