The Indo-Pak pink flamingo bombshell

A “pink flamingo” is a term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to “black swans“—the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown. The tense nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous pink flamingo in today’s world.

The Indian subcontinent—home to both India and Pakistan—remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flashpoint.

Both the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet, unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis. These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.

Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilise half a million troops in less than 72 hours.

The problem is that unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Islamabad clearly intends to use these weapons—on its own soil if necessary—to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armoured thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers and increases the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other destabilising characteristics to this already unstable mix.

Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors.

Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states. There may be little the US or the world can do to forestall this conflict that is looming over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require US policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to do so, and some small steps may help.

The US should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. And the US should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the US government’s recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. There is no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the world’s most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making. (This post was originally published on War on the Rocks where the authors write the Strategic Outpost column. )

By David Barno And Nora Bensahel