Pak’s major capitulation to China

It is highly unusual for a sovereign state to allow another state to establish a security apparatus, even if it is a joint arrangement, within its territorial boundaries. Such an agreement inherently implies a profound dysfunction or incapacity within the host state’s security framework - specifically, its national military - and represents a deliberate compromise of its sovereignty.

The reported success of China’s coercive diplomacy in persuading the Pakistani government to authorise the formation of a joint security force on Pakistani soil, ostensibly to protect Chinese interests and personnel, highlights the ongoing entrenched practices within Pakistan, particularly regarding the pervasive influence of the Pakistan Army.

A recent report by Nikkei Asia titled ‘China eye security tie-ups after deadly militant attacks’ indicates that the Pakistani government has consented to a bilateral agreement facilitating the establishment of joint security companies with Beijing, thereby officially allowing Chinese security officials to operate within Pakistan’s borders. The report further reveals that this arrangement would enable these forces to transport Chinese nationals in armoured vehicles as part of the security measures. This development not only marks a significant departure from previous frameworks governing Sino-Pakistani relations but also constitutes a direct infringement on Pakistan’s sovereignty, sanctioned by the very institution tasked with its defence—the Pakistan Army.

Moreover, this arrangement highlights China’s apparent lack of confidence in the Pakistan Army’s ability to adequately protect its personnel, infrastructure, and strategic interests amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment that has repeatedly targeted Chinese nationals and projects in recent years.

Pakistan has experienced a marked escalation in terrorism-related incidents in recent years, significantly undermining its internal security. Despite conducting thousands of intelligence-based operations (IBOs) across the country’s hinterland, the Pakistani security establishment has struggled to contain the violence.

Data from the Islamabad-based Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) reveals that the country recorded nearly 500 terrorist attacks in the first six months of 2024 alone, resulting in more than 800 fatalities, primarily among its security officials.

However, what is particularly notable is the discernible increase in the targeting of Chinese personnel and China-affiliated projects, especially within the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Both of these provinces have been epicentres of protracted insurgencies for decades, challenging the Pakistani state’s authority over their lands.

In recent years, relations between Islamabad and Beijing have significantly deepened, with China’s presence rapidly expanding across Pakistan, primarily under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

This growing Chinese footprint includes not only extensive infrastructure projects but also considerable involvement in the extraction of Pakistan’s natural resources, particularly in the mineral-rich province of Balochistan.

This increased Chinese engagement, especially in resource extraction, has intensified local grievances, as the local populations remain marginalised and deprived of basic amenities and essential services, escalating tensions and fuelling discontent in an already volatile region.

Consequently, China is perceived as a direct beneficiary of Pakistan’s exploitation of Balochistan’s mineral resources and is thus seen as complicit in exacerbating the hardships faced by the local people.

In March of this year, Pakistan faced a series of significant attacks within a single week, all explicitly targeting Chinese interests and nationals. On March 20, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched an assault on the heavily fortified Gwadar Port Authority Complex in Balochistan.

This complex houses the offices of port officials alongside commercial spaces. Gwadar port is considered a key project within the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, serving as a symbolic and strategic nexus for Chinese investment in the region.

The insurgents’ ability to penetrate deeply into the complex revealed critical vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s security framework. Following this, on March 25, Baloch insurgents attacked the Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Siddique base in Turbat, claiming it was a response to China’s expanding presence in Balochistan.

However, the most significant attack occurred on March 26, 2024, when a suicide bomber targeted a convoy transporting Chinese workers near Bisham city in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Shangla district. The convoy was en route to the Dasu hydropower project, which is being constructed by a Chinese company in the Upper Kohistan district.

It is worth noting that nine Chinese nationals were killed in a similar incident in Dasu in 2021 when a bus carrying Chinese workers was attacked by a suicide bomber. These incidents highlight the ongoing security challenges faced by Chinese projects and personnel, as well as the Pakistani government’s failure to address such threats effectively.

The loss of Chinese lives prompted a notable shift in Beijing’s stance; Chinese officials began openly criticising the Pakistani government for its inability to protect Chinese nationals and its critical infrastructure projects within the country.

On March 27, China’s Foreign Office issued a strongly worded statement urging the Pakistani government to “thoroughly investigate the incident as soon as possible, hunt down the perpetrators, and bring them to justice.”

This diplomatic rebuke underscored Beijing’s growing frustration with the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, with senior Chinese officials like Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC), continuously pressing Islamabad regarding its failures to tackle the escalating threats to Chinese interests.

The repeated and monumental failures of the Pakistani state to safeguard Chinese nationals and protect the strategic CPEC projects, coupled with the escalating debt obligations owed to Beijing, strongly suggest a substantial erosion of Pakistan’s sovereign decision-making capacity.

A salient example of this dynamic can be observed in the lead-up to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China in June 2024. Beijing reportedly set explicit preconditions for the visit, contingent upon Islamabad’s commitment to launch a comprehensive military operation akin to the 2014 Zarb-e-Azb campaign. In compliance, the desperate Pakistani government announced “Operation Azm-e-Istehkam” within two weeks of Sharif’s return from China on June 22, a move that was met with approval from Chinese officials. Furthermore, Liu Jianchao, a senior Communist Party official, was stationed in Islamabad ahead of this development, emphasising in an all-party gathering on June 21 that a growing ‘internal security deficit’ constituted a major threat to Beijing’s CPEC cooperation with Pakistan and hence required urgent attention from the Pakistani government.

This sequence of events vividly illustrates the extent of China’s leverage over Pakistan and, conversely, the significant decline in Pakistan’s autonomous decision-making apparatus. In this context, alongside reports of Beijing’s ongoing pressure on Islamabad to cede operational control of Gwadar Port to the Chinese navy for establishing a military base, and the recent “agreement” allowing Chinese security personnel to operate within Pakistan’s borders, the increasing entanglement of foreign influence in areas traditionally reserved for sovereign authority becomes increasingly apparent.

These developments raise serious concerns about the erosion of Pakistan’s national sovereignty and the broader implications for its governance and autonomy.

(Agencies)