IAF gets a new lease of life

Modi’s Rafale deal is like buying ready-to-eat snack without bothering to cook an elaborate meal that could get problematic, delayed and definitely expensive. It is also a government-to-government deal, where the impact of political challenges is minimal, if any. The bottom line is that India needs 42 squadrons of combat aircraft and has only 32 or 34 that include Russian MiG 21s and MiF 27 that need refurbishing; Many of them have completed their flying life

In a recent interview, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said he was adhering to a known Gujarati trait “single fare, double journey” by combining France, Germany and Canada on his “link West” journey. While on tour, he did another ‘Gujarati’ thing: buying Rafale aircraft off-the-shelf without getting entangled in the contentious aspects of making them at home for which pricing had got disputed.

Gujaratis make good snacks. His Rafale deal is like buying ready-to-eat snack without bothering to cook an elaborate meal that could get problematic, delayed and definitely expensive. Although Dassault Aviation had won the tender on the basis of technical evaluation and its “lowest” bid, the costing after accounting for periodic escalations during the life of the programme was also touching $24 billion. There was hard bargaining and the French seemed ready to reduce the price, if only India placed the order. Instead of 18, India doubled the order. Thirty-six Rafale, the Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) coming to India at $4 billion will be cheaper than what the French contracted with Egypt, 24 Rafale for $5.9 billion.

Negotiations were conducted by officials on both sides till the very last week and it seemed the deal would be postponed, yet again. Scrapping it would have meant India paying heavy penalties. A government-to-government deal, it was realised, would be without problems and more transparent. The decision was left to the political leadership. The one taken was the most sensible and perhaps, the only way out. By doing so, Modi lifted a big burden off the backs of his defence planners. He also helped his host, President Francois Hollande to keep the Rafale maker going with enough work. Dassault needed the Indian deal, even an abridged one.

When India short-listed Rafale in 2012, the joke among the French was, a happy Dassault leadership bathed the Eiffel Tower with Champagne!India thus consolidated its enduring strategic relationship with France.Beyond this, however, Indian Air Force (IAF) needs the aircraft badly because of long delays in decision-making, causing its inventory to deplete fast and confined largely to old Russian-made aircraft. The situation has been precarious with huge delays in the development of the light combat aircraft (LCA).

The original deal was for 126 Rafale aircraft and was worth $12 to 15 billion, India’s largest. When India short-listed Rafale in 2012, it upset other competitors, among them the Russians, the Americans, the Swedish and the British no end. The British Parliament, indeed, debated what it saw as India’s insolence in rejecting the British candidate. At the same time, India was criticised for spending high on defence (but not buying enough from the British), when it had millions of poor to feed, clothe and house. Demands were made that Britain should curtail or cancel its aid for India’s development projects.

These fulminations apart, it remains to be seen whether the race would begin anew. It is also likely that the earlier deal on aircraft to be manufactured in India still stands and would be renegotiated with Dassault. But one thing seems clear. There is no question of going back to the drawing board to re-issue the RFP (Request for Proposal) which would add to the delay and could attract unnecessary criticism, political opposition and allegations of corruption, which this government is keen to avoid.Who would collaborate with Dassault, only the defence public sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) or would private entrepreneurs step in to “Make in India”? These questions do not have immediate and easy answers.

For now, it is quick delivery of the ones ordered, to begin, hopefully, by end-2016. It is not surprising that Defence Minister Manohar Parikar has called the Rafale deal ‘oxygen’ for the IAF.Writing in India Strategic, a renowned Indian journal on defence studies, Air Marshal V K Jimmy Bhatia (retd.) and Editorial Director Gulshan Rai Luthra recall that the Government-to-Government route has been found to be the best while buying aircraft and systems from the US under the latter’s well-established Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route but for the French, while political leaders and diplomats help in military equipment sales, any deals are done directly with the manufacturers.

In a Government-to-Government deal, the impact of political challenges is minimal, if any. This route was described as the most acceptable even by the previous Defence Minister, A K Antony, who had to postpone crucial decisions occasionally due to periodic allegations played up in the media; it didn’t matter most of them were blatantly wrong and inspired by vested interests.

According to Bhatia and Luthra, senior officers have already asked Modi's Government for protection against prosecution while discharging their duties, and some administrative rules are being amended. The bottom line is that India needs 42 squadrons of combat aircraft and has only 32 or 34 that include Russian MiG 21s and MiF 27 that need refurbishing, many of them having completed their flying life. The Mirage 2000 purchased from Dasssault in the mied1980s are currently being refurbished to extend their operational life.

India also must contend with a hostile neighbourhood where two of them, Pakistan and China, are in close collaboration and Russia, the erstwhile biggest supplier, although still in the Indian reckoning, is looking for greener pastures. Thankfully, the Rafale deal, even if in its curtailed but workable form, has materialised faster than most Indian defence deals that have taken much longer due to slow decision-making, red-tape, bad coordination between the civil and military brass, sanctions imposed by foreign governments because India conducted nuclear tests and the past make-at-home preference leading to huge time and cost overlaps.

Two examples would suffice. Arjun, the main battle tank (MBT) for the Army, and the Tejas, the LCA, which were conceived in the 1980s. Vikramaditya, the aircraft carrier purchased from Russia, also took a quarter-of-a-century. A generation of men in uniform went without them. Not to be forgotten were the scandals of the 1980s – the Swedish Bofors 155 MM gun and the German submarine – that caused political stink and prevented decision-making, demoralising the armed forces. Tragically, nothing came of numerous probes into these deals. This has been India’s past record. The present and the future, hopefully, would be better.