Rise of toxic casteism in modern India

Caste remains one of the most complicated and misunderstood concepts
Caste System, British Colonial Rule, Social Mobility, Census Enumeration, Reservation Policy, Political Impacty. This fluidity allowed for upward and downward mobility of caste groups based on shifting socio-political and economic circumstances, as well as the amalgamation or splintering of caste identities. The British colonial intervention, particularly through the census process starting in 1871-72, played a pivotal role in ossifying this once-dynamic system into a more fixed and hierarchical structure. Let’s break this down in detail.
Pre-Colonial Fluidity of the Caste System
The caste system, rooted in the ancient varna framework (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras), was never as rigid in practice as it appeared in theory. While the varna system provided a broad ideological structure, the lived reality of caste operated through endogamous, occupation-based communities that numbered in the hundreds. Jati-s or Kula-s were far more localised and flexible, adapting to regional contexts, economic opportunities, and political power shifts.
Upward Mobility: Groups could elevate their status by acquiring wealth, land, or military power. For instance, a community of peasants or traders could claim Kshatriya or Vaishya status by aligning themselves with ruling elites or adopting rituals associated with higher varnas. Historical examples include the Kshatriya, many of whom emerged from diverse castes, gradually consolidating power and claiming Kshatriya lineage. Similarly, merchant communities gained prominence as economic conditions favoured trade, often aligning their identity with the Vaishya varna.
Downward Mobility: Conversely, loss of political or economic power could lead to a decline in caste status. A ruling family or warrior group defeated in war might be relegated to a lower social standing, their descendants blending into less prestigious jatis. Occupational shifts also played a role eroding the caste status over time. For example, in Telugu region, the Mala, also known as Nethakani in some areas, were traditionally a community of weavers in India, skilled in producing textiles that sustained their livelihood. However, during the British colonial rule, the influx of mass-produced, imported textiles flooded the Indian market. These British goods were often cheaper and more readily available, undercutting the local weaving industry. As a result, the Malas, who depended on their weaving trade for economic stability, faced severe financial hardships. The loss of their traditional occupation led to widespread poverty and pauperisation. Over time, this economic decline contributed to their social marginalisation. So much so, that in the Census, the British grouped them under "untouchables", which they were not, along with the Madiga, a community traditionally associated with leather and footwear making. This shift reflects how colonial economic policies disrupted indigenous livelihoods and exacerbated existing social hierarchies.
Amalgamation and Splintering: Castes frequently merged or split based on alliances, migrations, or economic specialisation. For example, inter-caste marriages, though not the norm, could lead to the formation of new castes. In Kerala, the Nairs evolved as a distinct caste through a mix of martial traditions and matrilineal practices, absorbing influences from various groups over centuries. Conversely, a single caste might splinter into multiple factions if its members diverged in occupation or geographic location, each claiming a distinct identity. For example, in the Telugu region, Kamma, Reddy, and Velama castes emerged out of the Kapu caste due to shift in their economic or political status.
This fluidity was supported by a decentralised socio-political structure in pre-colonial India, where local kings, chieftains, and village councils held sway over caste matters rather than a centralised authority. Caste was negotiated through custom, ritual, and power dynamics, not enforced by a uniform legal code.
Colonial Caste Enumeration and Freezing of Caste
The arrival of British colonial rule in the 18th and the 19th centuries fundamentally altered this dynamic system. The British sought to govern India through a systematic understanding of its population, and the caste system became a convenient lens for classification. It was also primarily a tool to divide the Hindu society which was vehemently resisting the colonial rule. The first systematic attempt at a census in India was made in 1871-72, which included caste enumeration. In 1881, the first comprehensive all-India census was conducted, marking a significant milestone in caste data collection. Caste was recorded and frozen systematically, reflecting the British interest in categorising the Hindu society. The 1931 Census was the last in colonial India to fully enumerate caste populations, as the 1941 Census, conducted during World War II, was impacted by wartime constraints.
Codification of Caste Identities: The British viewed caste as a fixed, hereditary, and hierarchical institution, influenced by their own rigid class-based worldview and the Jesuit-Orientalist misinterpretations of Hindu texts. They ignored the contextual and fluid nature of jati-s, instead assigning every individual a specific caste label in official records. This process required communities to define themselves within a static framework, often forcing them to align with one of the four varna-s or an "untouchable" category, even if their traditional status was ambiguous or contested.
Hierarchy and Ranking: The census didn’t just record castes—it ranked them. The British were obsessed with creating a definitive social hierarchy, often based on arbitrary criteria like "purity" or proximity to Brahmanical norms. This ignored the historical reality that many castes had overlapping or equal statuses in their regions. For example, a prosperous peasant community might suddenly find itself ranked below a poorer but "ritually purer" group, locking in disparities that hadn’t been so rigid before.
Freezing Mobility and Social Rigidity: Once documented, caste became a bureaucratic identity tied to legal rights, land ownership, and access to colonial institutions (e.g., jobs, education). This made it harder for groups to renegotiate their status as they had in the past. A community that might have claimed Kshatriya status through conquest or wealth now needed colonial recognition to make it "official." The census also discouraged amalgamation by treating jati-s as distinct and immutable, reducing the organic blending of identities.
Impact on Lower Castes: The British classification entrenched the marginalization of "untouchable" or "depressed" castes (later termed Dalits). Pre-colonial India had mechanisms for some outcast groups to integrate or shift status over generations, but the census cemented their exclusion by labeling them as permanently inferior.
Caste Consciousness: The census heightened awareness of caste distinctions, fostering competition and conflict between groups vying for higher status or colonial favor. This contributed to the politicisation of caste and the rise of toxic casteism in modern India.
Legacy in Independent India: Post-1947, the Indian state inherited this framework, using caste categories for affirmative action (e.g., reservations) and governance, further entrenching the colonial snapshot of a fluid system.
Post-Independence: Shift Away from Caste Enumeration
After India gained independence in 1947, the new government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a different stance on caste enumeration, reflecting a vision of national unity and modernisation. The first census of independent India in 1951 marked a significant shift. It deliberately excluded caste data for all groups except Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which were enumerated to implement constitutional affirmative action policies. The decision was driven by a desire to move away from caste-based divisions and promote a secular, egalitarian society. Nehru and other leaders saw caste enumeration as potentially divisive. This policy continued in every decennial census till 2011.
Mandal Commission & Renewed Interest
In 1979, the Janata Party government established the Mandal Commission, which submitted its report in 1980. Tasked with identifying socially and educationally backward classes, the commission relied on the 1931 Census data (the last available) and estimated that Other Backward Classes (OBCs) constituted 52% of India’s population. It recommended a 27% reservation for OBCs in government jobs and education. With the fall of the Janata Party, the report went into cold storage. In 1990, the National Front government, implemented the Mandal recommendations, sparking nationwide debates and protests. Critics argued that the lack of updated caste data undermined the policy’s legitimacy.
Irrationality of Backwardness: In the absence of an accepted definition or rational criteria for backwardness, caste groups are vying and agitating for inclusion as Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes, or under backward or extremely backward categories. Their success or failure reflects their political clout rather than any objective basis. This has exacerbated social animosity and strained social relations.
State-Led Caste Surveys: A New Trend
Though the BJP-led NDA Central government seems unwilling to undertake a nationwide caste census, its own State government of Bihar launched a comprehensive statewide caste survey in 2022-23. The findings indicated that OBCs and Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) made up over 63% of Bihar’s 13 crore population, with SCs at 19.65% and STs at 1.68%. These statistics spurred demands for expanded reservations and left a mark on national political debates.
In 2024-25, Telangana’s Congress-led government conducted a caste survey, revealing that Backward Classes (BCs) comprised 56.33% of the population (46.25% Hindu BCs and 10.08% BC Muslims), alongside Scheduled Castes at 17.43%, Scheduled Tribes at 10.45%, Other Castes at 13.31%, and OC Muslims at 2.48%. The State government decided to raise the BC reservation to 42% from 23%, exceeding the Supreme Court’s 50% reservation ceiling. Karnataka, too, conducted a caste survey, but its report remains unreleased amid political friction and pushback from influential communities like the Lingayats and the Vokkaligas, who have dismissed it as "unscientific" and questioned its credibility.
Ongoing Debates & Future Prospects
Historically, caste was a feature of Hindu society. Conversion narratives often highlight the Hindu religion’s caste hierarchy to attract lower-caste Hindus with promises of equality. Yet, if Christian and Muslim communities receive caste-based reservations, it could suggest that equality within these religions is a farce. For example, Dalit Christians have long demanded Scheduled Caste (SC) status, arguing they face the same discrimination in Christianity. By granting reservations to Christians and Muslims through the backdoor—by including them in Backward Classes (BC)—the Indian state is incentivising conversions away from the Hindu fold.
Secondly, identifying groups like "Backward Muslims" or "Dalit Christians" hinges on religious identity, even if the stated basis is social backwardness. Therefore, including Christians and Muslims in BC category and granting them reservations subverts the Constitutional prohibition on religion-based reservations.
Isn't independent India doing exactly – nay much worse than – what the colonial British did, which paved the way for the partition of India?
Conclusion
In essence, the pre-colonial caste system was a living, adaptive network of social relations, shaped by local power and economic realities. The British, through their census and administrative machinery, imposed a static, hierarchical model that stripped away its flexibility and permanently fractured Hindu society. This transformation didn’t merely record caste—it redefined and reconstructed it—locking Hindu society into a structure that persists, in modified form, to this day. This marks a critical turning point in India’s social history as it amplified this rigidity, pitting castes against each other for jobs, political representation, and resources.
This shift also left Hindu society vulnerable. Internally divided, it struggled to resist colonial domination or forge a unified response to modernity. The colonial ossification of the caste system fueled social fragmentation, which figures like Ambedkar later leveraged to critique the Hindu religion itself, even though Hindu theology and Hindu sociology are like two independent but inosculated trees. Today, caste remains a lightning rod—shaping identitarian politics—its colonial imprint still visible beneath layers of change.
In short, the colonial British didn’t merely document caste; they sculpted it into a form that suited their imperial needs of divide, rule, and ruin, igniting a slow-burning crisis within Hindu society. The political class, by perpetuating the colonial narrative through the colonial constitution—a paraphrased version of the Government of India Act, 1935—and their utterly selfish, myopic politics, has weaponized caste and fueled an internecine war engulfing Hindu society, from which there may be no recovery.
Paradoxically, the so-called upper castes, who stand to gain little from government-provided political, economic, or social advantages, tend to show apathy toward the caste system. On the other hand, SCs and BCs, despite denouncing it and revering Ambedkar—whose book “Annihilation of Caste’ called for its end—cling to it tenaciously and maintain strong caste identities to exploit its advantages.
(The author is retired IPS officer and a former Director of CBI. Views are personal)

















