Brig R A Singh, VSM ,(retd)

9 JAT was mobilised as part of 68 Inf Bde from Khrew( J&K) to Akhnoor area in Sep 1971 , to be launched as part of 10 Infantry Division offensive against Pakistan.Unit was concentrated in general area Akhnoor for the training and coordination for the planned offensive.All commanders of the unit upto platoon level were made to carry out recee of Pak BOPs ie Bokan, Dalla etc approximately 30 kms deep into Pak territory now, from Chhamb, in BSF uniform for the planned offensive. 9 JAT also carried out extensive Inf- tank cooperation training in area Jaurian ( PDC) with 9 Deccan Horse. Unit was ready as part of 68 Infantry Brigade ( Corps Reserve) to take revenge of 1965 loss of Chhamb from Pakistan this time.

On 03 Dec Pak carried out preemptive airstrikes on Indian airbases, which surprised all and the battle profile of 10 Infantry Division immediately changed from offensive to defensive operation, though their fmns were still in their def positions. 9 JAT was asked to move to Pallanwala sector to take defences on the eastern bank of River Manawar Tawi. Noone from the unit had ever seen this area, but the unit was pushed up to find its own ways and organise defences.

While the unit ( 9 JAT) was moving on 4 Dec 1971, during day on Akhnoor- Pallanwala axis for its new defensive operational task, on foot, troops of 191 Inf Bde who were forced by the enemy to abondon their permanent defs within just three days ,were also with- drawing on this axis from across the Manawar Tawi defences. One could imagine what impact such retrograde operation would have on the morale of these fresh troops of 9 JAT, moving up to take defences in absolutely new area ,to stall enemy's advance, which was following close on the withdrawing troop's heels. To precipitate the problem, few Pak arty OPs had also managed to infiltrate alongwith the withdrawing troops of 191 Inf Bde, and were bringing accurate arty fire on our moving column.

However ,the Unit managed to reach its new operational location in an excellent shape and high morale. Having reached Pallan- wala , Bn HQ occupied bathing cubicles of a well outside the School since there was intense enemy arty shelling and no defs were there in that area . Companies were briefed about the general area for their defs on the eastern bank of Manawar Tawi river, absolutely a new area for the unit.

9 JAT, Companies had to take up hurried defensive positions along the Munawar Tawi’s East Bank. The area had 10 feet high sarkanda grass, and was interspersed with boggy patches. For the sake of administrative convenience their platoon localities were sited about 50 m behind the riverline without having visible fields of fire and domination over the Tawi. There were no mines or other def stores and the the defences were hastily prepared within 4- 5 days time.

There was also no tanks support or arty OP with the unit. The unit was guarding Raipur and Darh crossings, the most expected route of enemy armour ingress without any outside support.Since the unit just came from Mod 'M' to 'P' , it hurriedly managed to collect it's rcl guns ( six only) from Mumbai and also no worthwhile conversion training of dets could be carried out before deployment on Manawar Tawi defs.

The expected attack on 9 JAT area was launched by Pak 111 Brigade of 23 Pak Inf Div and their 28 Cavalry. The attack commenced at 0100 hours on 10 December opposite Darh and Raipur crossings. This included assualting of the two forward Companies of 9 JAT by enemy tanks as well as its Depth Company, which were over-run in the Pak 28 CAV led assaults. Since there was no armour support with 9 JAT it was purely Infantry- tank battle. Some jawans of 9 JAT tried to climb the assaulting enemy tanks and some faced these with their SLR rifles and died fighting. But the Balwans of 9 JAT didn't' leave their trenches/ locs .The following enemy Infantry assualt was repulsed by the unit despite severe defensive handicaps, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy but in turn suffered loss of ,Officers-3, JCOs-3 and ORs 76, killed. 9 JAT also suffered equal number as wounded, hence unit was minus two rifle companies including their coy cdrs ( killed) on the next fateful day of 10 Dec 71.

Despite so many casualities, 9 JAT companies didn't leave their positions which later provided a firm base for our ,10 Inf Div counter attack , to regain lost locs. Small mercies certainly came in from the God for 9 JAT jawans that the area around these two crossings of Manawar Tawi was very boggy for the enemy tanks to maneaovure hence these couldn't move ahead and secondly the GOC Pak assaulting 23 Inf Div died in a heptr crash on 10 Dec, and the comd shifted to C arty 23 Inf Div , who didn't press on the gains . Hence our Div counter attacking force didn't find the enemy who had already withdrawn to the west of Manawar Tawi.

Despite their numerical superiority and geographical advantage, the Pakistan forces failed to make inroads and multiple attacks were beaten back by fierce and brave 9 JAT Balwans occupying weak defences. It was the resolute leadership and dauntless courage of officers and men of 9 JAT that stemmed the tide of multiple waves of enemy onslaught, ensuring the unit held on its defences despite all odds in the honour of their unit, Regt,Quam and the nation.

But unfortunately this valour of 9 JAT was not recognised by 10 Infantry Division since 9 JAT was part of Corps Reserve and secondly as usual the fmn overlooks such act of bravery when you suffer overall serious reverses in the battle. So was the case with 10 Infantry Division who lost Chhamb sector again the second time to Pakistan.

9 JAT pays rich tributes to its martyrs in the Battle of Chhamb- 71 on 10 Dec every year.Aim now is to get the unit it's due recognition in the Battle of Chhamb 71, which has been overlooked till date.In real terms it was 9 JAT who stalled the enemy advance to Akhnoor at Manawar Tawi at a very high cost .

( The author was ( Capt) the Adjutant of 9 JAT during the Battle of Chhamb -1971 ).